In securities fraud litigation, plaintiffs must establish that the subject stock traded in an informationally efficient market in order to obtain a certified class action. Informational efficiency, in the legal context, means that a stock consistently reacts to unexpected, material information, which therefore implies that alleged misrepresentations and omissions, if material, are reflected in the security price. Courts generally require empirical evidence of a cause-andeffect relationship between the flow of news and stock price movements to establish market efficiency. Courts also give weight to a set of characteristics that may indicate market efficiency, the Cammer/Krogman factors, which comprise firm size, volume, bid-ask spread, number of market makers, and analyst coverage. A narrow bid-ask spread and a high count in the other factors are accepted as indicia of market efficiency. In this paper, we examine how reliably the Cammer/Krogman factors indicate consistent reactivity to earnings announcements, which may under certain conditions indicate market efficiency.
Stock Price Reactivity to Earnings Announcements in a Cross-Section of Cammer/Krogman Factors

I. Background and Introduction
A. Securities Litigation and Market Efficiency Overview
If a company makes misrepresentations or misleading omissions that artificially inflate the value of its issued securities, it may be liable for damages to consequently injured investors pursuant to the Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. However, pursuing a securities fraud claim against a public corporation is extremely expensive, 1 while the potential recovery to an average investor is generally modest. Therefore, to seek relief, investors generally must band together and pursue their claims in a class action against the company.
Class action securities litigation is not uncommon, and, in fact, has become part of the securities market and regulation enforcement landscape. In 2015, there were 189 such actions filed.
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In 2016, 270 cases were filed, which is more than one per trading day. In 2015, case settlements ranged between $400,000 and $970.5 million, averaging $37.9 million per case. 3 The largest settlements in history were in the Enron case, $7.3 billion, and the WorldCom case, $6.1 billion. A recent case involving Household International settled in 2016 for $1.6 billion.
Notwithstanding the frequency and settlement size of class action security lawsuits, the hurdles faced by plaintiffs are high. In particular, before a case goes to trial to determine liability and damages, plaintiffs must prove to the court that the action is best brought as a class action. Among the conditions required for class certification is class-wide reliance. For any particular investor, a company's misrepresentation is actionable fraud only if the misstatement at issue was relied upon such that it affected a transaction decision or price. Class certification requires that reliance be provable class wide, without individual inquiry. When so many investors admittedly do not study company financial statements, monitor conference calls, or listen to company presentations, so that they may never have heard or even known about an alleged misrepresentation, how can reliance be established class wide? This question was tackled in the landmark Basic v. Levinson case of 1988. 4 Plaintiffs argued, and the Court set precedent by agreeing, that when a security trades in an efficient market, such that the price of the security reflects all available information, the market price will also reflect the alleged misinformation. The market effectively relies on the misinformation, and therefore so do all investors, because investors rely on and transact at market prices. This principle, of tracing reliance through market efficiency, is known as "Fraud on the Market." 4 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243,108 S. Ct. 978, 988-89, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988) .
Plaintiffs bear the burden to affirmatively prove market efficiency in order to invoke the Fraud on the Market principle. Historically, defendants could prevail either by proving a security does not trade efficiently or simply by showing that plaintiffs have not provided sufficient proof. The Cammer 5 and Krogman 6 courts addressed the type of evidence sufficient for legal proof of market efficiency. The Cammer court stated that the following characteristics could indicate that a security trades in an efficient market: trading volume, analyst coverage, the number of market makers, eligibility for S-3 registration (which in turn requires a threshold market capitalization and a history of timely financial reports), and empirical evidence of a cause and effect relationship between information flow and price movement. The Krogman court added bid-ask spread, float, and market capitalization.
The Court in Halliburton II clarified that the type of market efficiency that is necessary for the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is informational efficiency, as opposed to fundamental efficiency, reiterating the Basic Court's opinion that the fraud-on-the-market doctrine rests on the "fairly modest premise that 'market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices. '" 7 Informational efficiency means that a market is sufficiently well-developed such that material public information is not ignored, but rather is disseminated, digested, and traded upon, so that market prices reflect all available information, including fraudulent misinformation. Fundamental efficiency, by contrast, means that the prevailing market price conforms, at all times, to the specific valuation dictated by a particular investor's or analyst's fundamental valuation model. Informational efficiency, which plaintiffs must prove, describes the absorption and reflection of information, not the exact correctness of the market price. Both Fama [1991] and Tobin [1984] recognized informational efficiency as a distinct concept from fundamental efficiency.
B. Empirical Tests of Market Efficiency in Securities Litigation
Following Fama [1991] , event studies have become the standard empirical test of market efficiency in securities litigation. 8 However event studies in academic journals are quite different than those performed for security litigation purposes. Academic event studies review hundreds if not thousands of firms to evaluate whether some news or piece of information affects significantly asset returns: A subset of these assets may suffer from countervailing news but another subset will have supportive news; idiosyncratic behaviors will be washed out in the aggregate and academic studies can answer the question whether a specific news or piece of information has on average a particular effect on asset prices. In security litigation studies, the 5 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 , 1273 (D.N.J. 1989 . 6 Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex. 2001) . 7 In re Petrobras Securities Litigation, 312 F.R. D. 354, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 8 "The cleanest evidence on market-efficiency comes from event studies, especially event studies on daily returns. When an information event can be dated precisely, and the event has a large effect on prices, the way one abstracts from expected returns to measure abnormal daily returns is a second-order consideration. As a result, event studies give a clear picture of the speed of adjustment of prices to information." ("Efficient Capital Markets: II," by Eugene F. Fama, Journal of Finance, 1991 , p. 1607 focus is by definition on the particular security under scrutiny, so any idiosyncratic behavior may play a key role and will not cancel out. Thus, while there is general agreement as to the proper event study methodology 9 , there are also typical areas of dispute in security litigation. Defense experts often argue that the plaintiffs' expert cherry-picked events to test, selecting only events that did move a stock price significantly, while ignoring events that did not elicit a significant price change.
In order to be valid, event selection must be objective. However, ideal candidate events are those on which news emerged that reasonably should move the security price a significant amount, because a non-significant return in reaction to modest news, while consistent with market efficiency, proves and disproves nothing statistically.
Competing experts debate what news should reasonably move a stock price significantly.
Another area of contention involves the dispositive number of significant events. If, for example, 8 of 12 tested events have significant stock price movements, is this enough to support a finding of efficiency? Or, does the result prove inefficiency? The answer depends on further evaluation of the information that emerged on the event dates. Perhaps the events were included based on an objective selection rule (such as to include all 8-K releases or earnings announcements), but the particular information released on the non-significant event dates turned out to be expected or of modest valuation importance. Alternatively, if market participants ignored big news on the 4 non-significant event dates, or were precluded from trading on the news, this finding could indicate inefficiency. A subjective valuation analysis may be necessary to interpret the objective event study results.
Addressing event selection and proper incidence rate, Ferrillo, Dunbar, and Tabak [2004] proposed a different kind of empirical test for market efficiency ("FDT test"). Their test evaluates event date reactions collectively. They sort a company's time series of stock returns into two groups, one comprising news days and the other non-news days. In some applications of the test, the dates are divided based on whether a news story about the company appeared in a Factiva search. In other applications, the selection criteria is more restrictive, wherein news days are all 8-K release days. Still more restrictive applications divide the time series into earnings announcement dates versus all other dates.
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The test requires that a market model of the stock dynamics be estimated, regressing the daily stock returns on market and sector returns to derive firm-specific residual returns. Residual returns are then tested for statistical significance -that is, that they are significantly different from zero. Finally, a Z-test (a Proportions test as is known in statistical textbooks) is conducted to ascertain whether the proportion of significant residual returns is statistically greater among the news days than among the non-news days. If the proportion of significant returns is significantly greater in the "news" sample than in the "nonnews" sample, one can conclude that the stock reacts to news, and the type of informational efficiency of concern to courts is established for "Fraud on the Market".
The origins of the FDT test (Z-test) are in epidemiology, where cure rates are compared for a treatment sample and a placebo sample. The FDT test was accepted by the court in the Polymedica Securities Litigation and in the recent Petrobras Securities Litigation. The advantages of the FDT test are that event selection is relatively objective and the critical proportions are statistically determined. As long as the sorting rule places days that generally have greater information flow into the "news" day sample, there is no need to evaluate the particular information content of each such day, as reactivity to information, if it exists, will be evident collectively. A significant difference in the return proportions across the two samples must necessarily be attributed to the conditioning factor, which is information flow, thereby establishing that the security price reacts to information.
In our present study we analyze 4 announcements per calendar year, and we want to evaluate reactivity per calendar year as our unit of observation, thus we use a small-sample version of the FDT Proportions test, the Fisher Exact test. The FDT test and the small-sample version, the Fisher Exact test, are similar in spirit to other collective event tests applied in recent cases. The Ansari-Bradley test, for example, is a non-parametric test for difference in dispersion across two samples, which has been applied to support a finding of market efficiency.
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Greater dispersion in the sample of news days as compared to non-news or lesser news days indicates reactivity to information flow, which is empirical evidence of informational market efficiency.
II. Reactivity Versus Efficiency
In this paper we test the relationships between the Cammer/Krogman factors and stock price reactivity detected by the new class of collective event tests.
Earnings announcements are a very reasonable choice for a class of events that can be selected objectively. According to the finance literature, the flow of company-specific information is elevated on earnings announcement dates (see, e.g. Ball and Kothari (1991) and Beaver (1998), p. 38). We choose to focus on earnings announcements rather than earnings surprises because whether or not reported earnings differ from prior expectations, earnings announcements convey a great deal of information in addition to the earnings result. For example, earnings announcements are often accompanied by revenue results, forward guidance, and management's discussion of other important developments. Thus, the flow of information on earnings announcement dates is generally greater on earnings announcement dates than on other more typical days.
There are a number of reasons why a stock may fail to indicate significant reactivity to earnings announcements, only one of which is market inefficiency. Other reasons include a high incidence of earnings announcements that are 1) in line with expectations, 2) accompanied by confounding countervailing information, or 3) immaterial to a company's valuation on account of the nature of the company's business or the stage of development of the company. In line earnings would generally not move a stock price significantly in an efficient market.
11
For example, the Ansari-Bradley test has been applied in: In Re JPMorgan Chase & Co. Securities Litigation, In Re Prudential Financial, Inc. Securities Litigation, and In Re Questcor Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation. Countervailing information accompanying a positive earnings surprise may include a negative revenue result or negative forward guidance, for example. Finally, a company in the development stage of its product, with no history of revenue or earnings, would generally be sensitive to news about development progress and insensitive to current earnings. Consequently, while stock price reactivity to earnings announcements establishes the element of market efficiency courts are interested in, a failure to establish reactivity does not necessarily prove inefficiency. In such cases, greater emphasis may be placed on the other indicators of market efficiency to determine if there appears to be an impediment to information flow or trading that hampers reactivity and efficiency.
Knowing how well the Cammer/Krogman factors indicate reactivity is useful information that can be applied to assess how reliably those factors may indicate market efficiency. This is the objective of this paper.
III.
Literature Review Barber et al. [1994] pioneered empirical investigation of the Cammer/Krogman factors as indicators of market efficiency. Examining all earnings announcements from all NASDAQ stocks over the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] (after screening for certain data availability), they ranked the return observations by the size of the earnings surprise and by the size of the price response. From among the largest earnings surprises (in either direction), they identified the price response observations that landed in the median quintile, and labeled those observations "inefficient". That is, the observations that were small reactions to big surprises, were deemed inefficient. Barber et al. labelled the observations that were big reactions to big surprises, "efficient". They discarded all other return observations. Rather than labeling stocks as efficient or inefficient, the Barber et al. study labelled event return observations as efficient or inefficient. Both the efficient and inefficient samples grouped together observations from many stocks, and while Cammer/Krogman factor averages were retained for each group, the stock identities were disregarded. Our paper follows the lead of Barber et al. but differs in several important ways. First, whereas Barber et al. focused on the population of return observations grouped together from all the constituent stocks, we prefer to use company stock as the unit to be tested so that we can investigate the properties of individual stock issues. Second, we differentiate between the reactive and unreactive stocks based on a Proportions test (in this study, the Fisher Exact test), and the Ansari-Bradley test, which compose the new class of collective event study tests for market efficiency. Third, we use all CRSP stocks rather than only NASDAQ stocks. Barber et al. noted that it may be difficult to find inefficiently priced stocks among NYSE stocks, which is why they examined only NASDAQ stocks. By including NYSE and AMEX stocks, our sample has a wider range of factor values and levels of efficiency and is more likely to provide lessons for security litigation than a study of only NASDAQ stocks.
As noted above, Ferrillo, Dunbar, and Tabak [2004] introduced the Z-test for market efficiency. The Z-test is a type of Proportions test. They adapted the typical proportions test used in epidemiology, to a securities market setting. Recently, in a working paper, Tabak [2016] revisited the pros and cons of the FDT test and the related question of what would be a reasonable (or expected) fraction of news days associated with significant stock residual returns in order to consider that stock "efficient" in the legal sense for the fraud on the market doctrine. The author concludes that neither theory nor statistical evidence support a claim that at least 50% of news days would have to show a statistically significant residual return for the market to be considered efficient. Boudoukh et al. [2013] find that news days are 32.5% more likely to correspond with the bottom and top 10% of return days. 26.5% of news days are in the largest 20% of absolute value of returns, hence 26.5% would be an upper bound on the number of news days that would be in the largest 5% of absolute value of returns (to be significant at the two-tail 5% significance level). Griffin et al. [2011] show that sorting days by the magnitude of their absolute value price movements on a scale of 0 (smallest) to 100 (largest), the mean rank for news days in the US is between 57 and 58. Thus the price movement for a typical news day is only slightly above the average price movement and one needs to have big news in order to get significant (5% level) stock returns.
IV. Research Objective, Data and Methodology
We examine stock price reactivity to earnings announcements, conditioning across a broad sample of stocks on the following Cammer/Krogman factors: market capitalization, trading volume, bid-ask spread, number of market makers, and analyst coverage.
12
We seek to assess 12 We exclude S-3 registration eligibility as it is chiefly a function of market capitalization, which we do study. Similarly, we exclude float, for practical reasons, and because it is highly correlated with market capitalization. whether these factors are reliable indicators of reactivity. That is, we address whether a large market capitalization, for example, indicates a greater likelihood that a firm will exhibit significant reactivity to earnings announcements, and therefore potentially to other important news and events.
A. Data
We examine all stocks in the CRSP database for the years 2012 to 2015. We include only "code 11" stocks, i.e. ordinary common shares traded in US markets excluding mutual funds, ETFs, REITs, and ADRs. For each year of data, we include only stocks that have 4 earnings announcements in that calendar year, as indicated by I/B/E/S, and data for each of the five Cammer/Krogman factors. The only factor that seems to put a binding restriction in data availability is the number of market makers: A substantial number of stocks appear with "NA" number of market makers for the whole calendar year, while some other stocks appear with "zero" market makers in a calendar year, thus we decided to eliminate those observations with "NA" number of market makers These restrictions may introduce some selection bias, as the properties of stocks that are infrequently traded, newly issued midyear, delisted midyear, or do not regularly report earnings may reasonably be associated with market inefficiency. Consequently, these research results apply only to the universe of stocks that meet the inclusion criteria. The more complete data allows for more reliable statistical testing of the stocks we do include, and we do not believe the exclusions are a shortcoming of this research, as most securities involved in class action securities litigation do satisfy these criteria. Examination of less frequently traded stocks, new issues, or delisted stocks can be addressed in future work.
In 2012, for example, we start with 3,415 stocks in the CRSP database. Of those 3,415, only 2,888 have I/B/E/S announcement data for 2012. Of those 2,888, only 2,313 have all four quarterly announcements reported in I/B/E/S. Of those 2,313, only 1,500 have valid data for number of market makers during 2012 (the other Cammer/Krogman factors were never a binding constraint for stock data availability as was the number of market makers). We repeat this selection methodology for each year, ending up with 1,538 stocks in 2013; 1,644 stocks in 2014 and 1,729 stocks in 2015.
For each year, the stock sample is sorted by each of the considered Cammer/Krogman factors to construct quintile cohorts. For example, for the 2012 sample, we construct five quintiles by market capitalization, so that the first quintile contains the smallest stocks and the fifth quintile contains the largest 20% of the sample. We perform a similar sorting of the same stocks to form sets of quintile cohorts for each of the other considered factors: volume, bid-ask spread, number of market makers, and number of analysts.
For each stock and each factor, the respective factor value is the average for the year. For example, the market capitalization for any given stock is its average market capitalization over the course of the year. Bid-ask spreads for each stock were computed from the end-of-day bids and asks reported by CRSP, and then averaged for the year. Market maker data was similarly provided by CRSP, and our annual value for each stock is the average of the daily values. For the number of analysts covering each stock, we examined the number of analysts included in the I/B/E/S survey preceding each earnings announcement, and then for each stock we averaged the four quarterly observations. Thus, our number of analysts following the stock is the average number of analysts that provided earnings forecasts that year, similar to the definition used by Barber et al [1994] .
CRSP was the source for daily trading volume for each stock. We computed average daily turnover and used this metric as the volume factor. Average turnover is the volume metric generally considered in securities cases and which was discussed by legal commentators Bromberg and Lowenfells, who were cited by the Cammer court.
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The conventional wisdom about the Cammer/Krogman factors is that larger size, higher volume, narrower bid-ask spread, more market makers, and broader analyst coverage are associated with greater market efficiency. We test whether or not these relationships hold for earnings announcement reactivity.
B. Regressions to Derive Residual Returns and Test Statistical Significance of Individual Earnings Announcement Event Returns
A market model regression is run for each stock for each year. That is, log stock returns are regressed on an intercept and the log CRSP market return. Corresponding to the number of stocks included in each annual sample, there were 1,500 regressions for 2012; 1,538 for 2013; 1,644 for 2014 and 1,729 for 2015. The residual returns from each regression are the firmspecific returns after controlling for a market effect, i.e., the portion of the stock return that would be impacted by firm-specific news.
The same regressions establish whether or not each particular earnings announcement elicited a statistically significant price response. We look at the residual returns corresponding to the earnings announcement event dates ("effective" date, which takes into account the time of the day the news is released in order to set the correct market date). If a residual return's t-statistic is significant at the 5% level (two-tail, i.e. a critical value of 1.96 is used), we conclude that the stock reacted significantly to the earnings announcement.
C. Designating Stocks as Reactive or Non-Reactive
For each individual stock, we assess reactivity in two ways, with (1) the Fisher Exact test; and (2) the Ansari-Bradley test. Then, we assess whether there are statistically significant differences across the cohort quintiles in the proportion of stocks that exhibited reactivity.
Proportions Test (Fisher Exact test) for Incidence of Event Return Significance
For each stock in each year, we count the number of significant announcement event returns that are significant. The number can be 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. Then we compute the percentage out of the 4 announcements in a year so the proportion of significant returns in event days may be 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 100%. We also count the number of non-event day returns that are statistically significant and compute the percentage of non-event day returns that are significant. Because our annual samples have four earnings announcements, we use a Fisher Exact test, which is a Proportions test providing the exact probability of finding the two proportions in the events and non-events groups of observations for data with potential small sample issues. A discussion of the Fisher Exact test is presented in Appendix A.
Stocks that exhibit a significantly greater incidence rate of significant event returns are deemed to be reactive, whereas stocks that fail this test are deemed non-reactive pursuant to the Fisher Exact test. After labeling each stock as reactive or non-reactive, we compute the percentage of each factor quintile sample that is reactive. We subsequently test whether there are meaningful and significant differences between the number of reactive stocks in each quintile. If there are, this finding would indicate that the respective factor correlates with reactivity.
Ansari Bradley Dispersion Test
In addition to designating stocks as reactive or non-reactive based on the FDT test, we alternatively assign designations based on the Ansari-Bradley dispersion test. The AnsariBradley test is a non-parametric procedure to test the null that the stock return dispersion is the same in both samples, the sample of earning announcement event days and the sample of all other non-announcement days. If return dispersion is greater in the sample of earnings announcement event days than in the sample of all other days, it would indicate that earnings announcements cause greater stock price movement, which in turn allows a conclusion that the stock price reacts to information.
Based on this test, we designate each stock in each year as either reactive or non-reactive, and then examine the factor quintiles to determine whether or not reactivity is associated with factor values. Table 1 describes the range of values of each Cammer/Krogman factor per quintile and for each year. We will focus on the aggregate of the four years (2012-15) but the numbers per year are quite similar. There are 6,411 firm/year observations ranked in ascending order into quintiles.
V. Summary of Findings: Cammer/Krogman Factors as Indicators of Reactivity
Univariate Tests of Cammer/Krogman Factors
The size factor has a minimum value of $2.63M, a median value of $677.12M and a maximum value of $686.78B, that is, the maximum value is over a thousand times (1,014) larger than the median value while the median value is only 257 times the minimum value. The volume factor has a minimum value of 0.0047% of outstanding shares, a median value of 0.65% (138 times the minimum value) and a maximum value of 17.5% (27 times the median value). The bid-ask spread has a minimum value of 0.01%, a median value of 0.11% (about 11 times the minimum) and a maximum value of 8.58% (78 times the median value). The Analyst Following factor (number of analysts providing a forecast for earnings announcements) has a minimum of 1 analyst, a median of 5.5 analysts (integer numbers per announcement are averaged so an annual number can be a decimal (e.g. averaging 2, 2, 3, 3 analysts during the four quarters gives a 2.5 average analyst following), and a maximum number of 47.8 analysts. Thus, while the median-tominimum ratio is about 5.5, the maximum-to-median ratio is about 8.7. Finally, the number of market makers factor has a minimum value of zero (this is not an outlier as 614 stocks have zero market makers, that is 9.6% of all stocks or about half the stocks in quintile 1), a median value of 41.3 (i.e. 41.3 times the second minimum value of 1) and a maximum value of 79.5 (there are 18 socks with 70 or more market makers); thus, the maximum-to-median ratio is 1.9.
Volume and number of market makers are the only factors for which the median-to-minimum ratio is larger than the maximum-to-median ratio. Also, size is the factor with the most dispersion in terms of very high ratios of median-to-minimum (257) and maximum-to-median (1,014). This dispersion indicates a fast acceleration in size (market capitalization) as we move from the smallest stock to the largest stock and may suggest that the gains from size are achieved pretty early in the distribution. Small stocks may not be reactive to new information, but large enough stocks may be reactive and "enough size" may be achieved quickly in the distribution.
Summary of Results
Each firm is identified as reactive or non-reactive based on the significance of, or lack thereof, the Fisher Exact test or the Ansari-Bradley test, in each year. During each year, we only consider those firms that have four earnings announcements and data for the five factors. We have 1,500 observations in 2012; 1,538 in 2013; 1,644 in 2014 and 1,729 in 2015. Some firms appear all years and some firms only on some years. Instead of limiting the data to firms that have data for all 4 years, we stacked the observations for each year to construct the sample for 2012-2015, ending up with 6,411 observations. Our unit of observation is therefore a firm-year indicator of reactivity (or non-reactivity). Had we restricted our attention to firms with full data for each of the four years, there would be survivorship bias as those firms would have larger market capitalization, more volume, more analysts following, more market makers, and lower bid-ask spreads.
Section A. Reactivity with The Fisher Exact test
In Table 2 , panel A, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Fisher Exact test, in each size quintile. The proportion increases monotonically from 38% (quintile 1) to 76% (quintile 5). The lower part shows the p-values of a t-test for the difference in proportions of each quintile relative to all others. Based on this, the proportion increases significantly from quintile 1 up to 3, stabilizes between quintiles 3 (69%) and 4 (70%), but then, it increases significantly from quintile 4 to 5. The proportion in the complete sample is about 61% so only from quintile 3 on is the proportion significantly higher than the full sample. Overall, the larger the market capitalization of the firm, the more likely it is that its stock is reactive to earnings announcements.
In Table 2 , panel B, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Fisher Exact test, in each volume quintile. The proportion increases significantly from 36% (quintile 1) to 70% (quintile 3), stabilizes at 70% (quintile 4), then significantly falls to 65% in quintile 5, significantly below quintile 3 and not significantly different from quintile 2. The proportion in the complete sample is 61%, so from quintile 3 on the proportion of reactive stocks is significantly higher than in the complete sample. Volume quintiles 3 and 4 make it more likely that the stock will be reactive. But quintile 5 does not increase the probability relative to quintile 2, casting some doubt on volume as a factor driving price reactivity.
In Table 2 , panel C, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Fisher Exact test, in each bid-ask spread quintile. Note that we expect more stock price reactivity as the bid-ask spread decreases, which is the opposite direction that applies for the other factors. We see a monotonic statistically significant reduction in reactivity from 77% (quintile 1) to 34% (quintile 5), while the proportion in the complete sample is 61%; so only in quintiles 1, 2, and 3 is the proportion significantly larger. Thus, we conclude that the higher the bid-ask spread, the less likely the stock will be reactive.
In Table 2 , panel D, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Fisher Exact test, in each quintile of analyst coverage (number of analysts). There is a monotonic and significant increase in the proportion from quintile 1 (39%) to quintile 5 (76%) while the complete sample proportion is 61%; so only in quintiles 4 and 5 is the proportion significantly higher than the full sample (quintile 3 is higher than whole sample, but not significantly so). Thus, we conclude that the higher the number of analysts following the stock, the more likely it is that the stock is reactive.
In Table 2 , panel E, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Fisher Exact test, in each number of market makers quintile. For this factor, only quintiles 4 and 5 seem to have a bearing on the likelihood of a stock being reactive. The reactivity proportion in quintile 1 is 62% and goes down significantly to 41% in quintile 2, increases significantly to 59% in quintile 3 (which is at the same level as quintile 1). Only then there is a significant increase to 67% (quintile 4) and then another significant increase to 75%. The proportion in the complete sample is 61%, thus, only in quintiles 4 and 5 is the proportion significantly higher than the full sample. Thus, we conclude that the higher the number of market makers for the stock, the more likely it is that the stock is reactive.
Section B. Reactivity with the Ansari-Bradley test.
In Table 3 , panel A, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Ansari-Bradley test, in each size quintile. There is a monotonic and significant increase in the proportion from 45% (quintile 1) to 72 (quintile 3), it stabilizes at 75% (quintile 4), to again increase significantly to 79% (quintile 5). The complete sample proportion is 66% so only from quintile 3 on is the proportion significantly higher than the full sample. Thus, the larger the market capitalization of the stock, the more likely it is that it shows reactivity.
In Table 3 , panel B, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Ansari-Bradley test, in each volume quintile. There is a monotonic and significant increase in the proportion from 43% (quintile 1) to 73% (quintile 3), it stabilizes at 76% (quintile 4) and 73% (quintile 5) -the same level as quintile 3. The complete sample proportion is 66% so only from quintile 3 on is the proportion significantly higher than the full sample. Thus, the larger the volume of the stock, the more likely to show reactivity.
In Table 3 , panel C, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Ansari-Bradley test, in each bid-ask spread quintile. As was the case with the Fisher Exact tests, there is a monotonic and significant decrease in the proportion of reactive stocks as we increase the bid-ask spread (as expected) from 80% (quintile 1) to 41% (quintile 5). The complete sample proportion is 66% so quintiles 1, 2, and 3 have significantly larger proportions than the full sample. The larger the volume, the less likely the stock will be reactive.
In Table 3 , panel D, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Ansari-Bradley test, in each quintile of analyst coverage (number of analysts). As happened with the Fisher Exact tests, there is a monotonic and significant increase in the proportion of reactive stocks from 48% (quintile 1) to about 80% (quintile 5). The complete sample proportion is 66% so quintiles 4 and 5 are significantly higher than this full sample proportion (quintile 3 is higher but not significantly). Thus, the larger the number of analysts, the more likely the stock will show reactivity.
In Table 3 , panel E, we show the proportion of reactive firms, as per the Ansari-Bradley test, in each number of market makers quintile. In the same manner as with the Fisher Exact tests, the proportion of 65% (quintile 1) goes down significantly to 48% (quintile 2) and significantly recovers to 65% (quintile 3, same as quintile 1); the it significantly goes up to 74% (quintile 4) and to 80% (quintile 5). The full sample proportion is 66% so that only quintiles 4 and 5 are significantly higher than the full sample proportion. Thus, the more market makers, the more likely the stock will be reactive.
CONCLUSION: When a company has Cammer/Krogman factor values in the top 2 or 3 quintiles, there is in general a higher probability that this firm will show stock price reactivity to earnings announcements. The evidence is somewhat weaker for daily volume, as its quintile 5 has no more probability than quintile 2 to be reactive as measured by the Fisher Exact test, while the top 3 quintiles show a higher probability to be reactive when we measure reactivity with the Ansari-Bradley test.
Section C. Test for Differences in the Mean and Median of Reactive vs Non-Reactive Stocks
In Table 4 , panel A, we can see that there is a total of 6,411 observations in the 4-year period 2012-2015, of which 3,903 are reactive and 2,508 non-reactive as measured by the Fisher Exact test. The difference between the mean value of the reactive group and the non-reactive group is significant in all cases as per a two-sample t-test for differences in mean. The difference between the median value of the reactive group and the non-reactive group is significant in all cases as per a Wilcoxon ranksum test.
We will briefly discuss the results for the median: The median size value of reactive stocks is $946M while that of the non-reactive stocks is only $337M. The median daily volume of reactive stock is 0.72% while that of non-reactive stock is only 0.51%. The median value of the bid-ask spread is approx. 0.09% for reactive stocks while it is 0.23% for non-reactive stocks. The differences in the median values of the three factors above are both economically and statistically significant. The median value of the number of market makers is 44.2 for reactive stocks and 37.6 for non-reactive stocks; although the difference is statistically significant, there is no good economic reason to say that 37 market makers are on average not enough to increase the odds for a stock to be reactive, but 44 market makers does increase the odds. Finally, the median number of analysts following the stock is 6.8 for reactive stocks and only 4.0 for non-reactive stocks, with a statistically significant difference. Barber et al (1994) found that coverage by one or two analysts strengthened the presumption of efficiency for a publicly traded stock.
14 However, by construction, all our stocks have at least one analyst so we cannot test how having one analyst vs. zero would make a difference. Later in the paper, we will investigate the responsiveness or reactivity of stock prices to earnings announcements for a grid of threshold values of the Cammer/Krogman factors to find out factor levels with better odds for a stock to become reactive.
In Table 4 , panel B, we repeat the analysis but for the mean and median values of the factors from reactive and non-reactive stocks as measured by the Ansari-Bradley test. Of the 6,411 observations, 4,250 are reactive and the remaining 2,161 are non-reactive. All mean and median value differences are statistically significant. We briefly discuss the results for the median values. The median size for reactive stocks is $891M and for non-reactive only $331M. The median daily volume for reactive stocks is 0.73% while for non-reactive only 0.48%. The median bid-ask spread for reactive stocks is 0.09% while it is 0.23% for non-reactive stocks. The median value of the number of market makers is 44.0 for reactive stocks and for non-reactive stock is 37.1; as in the case of the Fisher Exact test before, there is no good economic reason to distinguish between 37 and 44 market makers but the point for now is only that the difference is significant. Finally, the median value of the number of analysts is 6.5 for non-reactive stocks and 4.0 for non-reactive stocks with a statistically significant difference. The logit regression has as dependent variable an indicator of a given stock being reactive (=1) or non-reactive (=0) as indicated by the Fisher Exact test. We separately run another set of logit regressions using an indicator dependent variable where reactivity is measured by the AnsariBradley test. Independent variables consist of an intercept and five indicators, one for each factor being "above or equal to" (=1) or "below" (=0) a given threshold value. The logit regression then will tell us how much each factor contributes to the likelihood of a stock being reactive when the factor value is above the threshold rather than below the threshold, controlling for all other factors. This is important because of the correlations between factors so we want to see if all factors hold the significance found with the univariate tests in a multivariate framework.
We will try different sets of threshold values, which are summarized in Table 5 and explained below. First, we use the median values of the factors in the stock data as the threshold values. This is a focal point of the distribution and it is natural to evaluate whether being above or below the median makes a difference for a stock in terms of reactivity. The median values of the factors for the 4-year period 2012-2015 can be seen in panel A of Table 5 and are given by: $677.12M (size), 0.6483% (daily volume), 0.1145% (bid-ask spread), 5.5 (number of analysts), and 41.3 (number of market makers). Secondly, we use the minimum factor values in quintiles 2, 3, and 4 (each quintile in a separate run). The idea is that factors may be more (or less) powerful drivers of reactivity before reaching the median value. For instance, how large (in terms of market capitalization) does a stock have to be to have a large probability of being reactive to news? Maybe by the time a stock reaches the second quintile of the distribution of size (from small to large), all the gains from being large are exhausted. The corresponding threshold values would then be the minimum factor values of the second quintile, as anything "above or equal to" these values would capture this higher probability. Notice that the median is exactly in the middle of the third quintile, but maybe the minimum values of the third quintile (rather than the middle values of the third quintile) are more indicative of reactivity. Similarly, one may think that a factor may not provide an increase in the probability of reactivity until it reaches the fourth or fifth quintile, thus we use the minimum values of the fourth quintile and separately of the fifth quintile as threshold values for the factors in the logit regressions. Panels B to E in Table 5 show the minimum values of each factor for quintiles 2 to 5 respectively.
Thirdly, we also use a "best individual threshold" set based on individual factor (univariate) logit regressions. We construct a grid of 25 values for each factor, reported in Table 5 , panel F.
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Then, we construct a threshold indicator variable for the factor value being "above or equal to" (=1) or below (=0) the first value in the grid, which together with an intercept comprise the right hand side of a logit regression. The left hand side is the stock reactivity indicator (reactive =1, non-reactive =0, as discussed before). We repeat this for every threshold value in the grid so we run 25 regressions for each factor and pick the "best individual" threshold value as that which maximizes the likelihood ratio (LR) of the logit regression vs an intercept only regression (this LR is common output in logit regressions and should be seen as the equivalent of an OLS regression F-statistic, which provides a measure of goodness of fit vs an intercept-only alternative). We report the "best individual" factor threshold values in Table 5 , panel F as well. These best individual factor threshold values are then used to construct the five indicator variables to be used together in a multivariate logit regression.
As explained in Garavaglia and Sharma (1998), 16 using indicator (dummy) variables in the left hand side and right hand side of the logit regression allows one to calculate odds ratios, i.e. the increase in the probability that the stock would be reactive given that the value of the factor is above the sample median rather than below, controlling for all other factors. For example, an odd 15 For size and volume, we start at the bottom 2% of the distribution and do increments to 80% of the distribution. For bid-ask spread (negative sign), we start at the bottom 20% and do increments to 98% of the distribution. For number of analysts, we start at 2 and do unitary increments to 25 (we include the median of 5.5 for completeness). The minimum value in the data is 1, so we must start at 2 to find effects other than an intercept. For number of market makers, we start at 1 and do unitary increments to 11; then equal increments of 3 up to 53. The minimum value in the data is 0 so we must start at 1 to find effects other than an intercept. As a reminder, we do not use factor values in the regression but an indicator variable ("1" when factor value >= threshold; "0" otherwise). Since all stocks have at least one analyst, a threshold of 1 would generate an indicator series of all ones, identical to the intercept. Thus, we must start at a threshold value other than the global minimum of the data. 16 Garavaglia, S. and A. Sharma. A Smart Guide to Dummy Variables: Four Applications and A Macro, Proceedings from the Northeast SAS Users Group, 1998, http://www.lexjansen.com/nesug/nesug98/stat/p046.pdf ratio of 1.10 increases the probability of being reactive by 10%, while an odd ratio of 0.90 decreases the probability of being reactive by 10%, with a unitary odd ratio being the benchmark. We also calculate a 95% confidence interval around this odds ratio to elucidate whether this increase in probability is statistically significant.
For instance, say beta(size) is the logit regression coefficient of the size factor in the multivariate regression and std(beta(size)) is its standard error. Then, Odds Ratio (size) = exp(beta(size)); 95% Confidence Interval (Odds Ratio (size)) = exp(beta(size)) +/-1.96*std(beta(size));
This confidence interval must be completely above 1 to indicate a positive increase in the probability of being reactive, and completely below 1 to denote a significant decrease in the probability of being reactive. If the confidence interval includes "1" then the probability of being reactive has not changed significantly. Table 6 shows the multivariate logit results for the case where reactivity is measured by the Fisher Exact test. This regression provides estimates for each factor controlling for the others. The first column in Table 6 refers to the median values of the factor distribution as thresholds. All coefficients have the right sign and all, but the size coefficient, are significant. The R2 is between 7% and 9% and the likelihood ratio is high. In the lower part of the table, the calculated odds ratios when the factor value for the stock is above the median instead of below the median indicate that the probability of the stock being reactive does not increase significantly for size, but increases by 16% for volume, decreases by 58% for the bid-ask spread (negative effect is expected), increases by 33% for the number of analysts, and increases significantly by 46% for the number of market makers.
SECTION B. LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS
The second column of Table 6 refers to the best individual thresholds. These values are: $356.82M (Size), 0.291% (volume), 0.23% (bid-ask spread), 5 (number of analysts), and 41 (number of market makers). Notice that size, volume and bid-ask spread "best individual" values are all below the median values described before (also see table 5), while the best individual values for analysts and market makers are exactly the median values. Coefficients have the right sign and all but the size coefficient are significant. The regression has R2 between 9% and 12% and a very high likelihood ratio. In the lower section of the table, we also calculate the odds ratio for each factor and find that when the factor value is above the best individual threshold (instead of below the threshold), the probability of the stock being reactive doesn't increase significantly for size, but increases by 81% for volume, decreases by 61% for bid-ask spread, increases by 22% for number of analysts and by 24% for number of market makers, in each case controlling for the other factors.
A quick summary of the quintile thresholds (minimum value in each quintile) and how they affect the probability of a stock becoming reactive indicates that the number of market makers needs to be at least in the third quintile to make a difference, i.e. at least 37.5 market makers, when controlling for the other factors. Also size and volume turnover of a stock peak in the third quintile. Volume in the fifth quintile may even be detrimental. But the other factors, bid-ask spread and number of analysts seem to work as posited and significantly as we move to higher quintiles. For instance, a number of analysts of 2.5 (minimum value of quintile 2) increases the probability of a stock being reactive but less than using the "best" value of 5 analysts. Notice that size significantly increase the probability of a stock being reactive when the threshold is the minimum value of quintile 2 or the minimum value of quintile 3, but not at or above the median value (which is in the middle of quintile 3), thus it is not that size is unimportant but rather that its effect on reactivity gets exhausted in the lower tail of the factor distribution. Table 7 shows the results when reactivity is measured by the Ansari-Bradley test. The multifactor regressions show coefficients, R2, and likelihood ratios similar to the respective cases in the previous Table. Since the important results are the odds ratios (and their confidence interval to determine whether they change significantly or not), we proceed directly to the lower part of Table 7 .
The odds ratio when the factor value is above the median (instead of below the median) indicates that the probability of the stock being reactive does not increase significantly for size, but increases by 42% for volume, decreases by 53% for the bid-ask spread (negative effect is expected), increases by 16% for the number of analysts, and increases by 58% for the number of market makers.
The best individual threshold values are the same as for the logit regressions using Fisher test reactivity. For completeness, these values are: $356.82M (Size), 0.291% (volume), 0.23% (bidask spread), 5 (number of analysts), and 41 (number of market makers).We calculate the odds ratio for each factor when the factor value is above the best individual threshold (instead of below the threshold) and find that the probability of the stock being reactive doesn't increase significantly for size, but increases by 92% for daily volume, decreases by 52% for bid-ask spread, increases by 16% for number of analysts and by 39% for number of market makers, in each case controlling for the other factors.
A quick summary of the quintile thresholds and how they affect the odds of a stock being reactive would be that size peaks at quintile 3 and volume at quintile 4, i.e. moving to the next quintile would not improve the odds ratio. The other factors seem to work as posited as we move to higher quintiles. Again, notice that although the size factor is not significant in the logit regressions when the median or the best individual thresholds are used, it is significant when the minimum values of quintiles 2 and 3, respectively, are used as thresholds. Thus, it seems that its effect on reactivity gets exhausted in the lower tail of the factor distribution.
VI. Conclusions
We test the relationship between Cammer/Krogman factors and stock price reactivity to earnings announcements as detected by the new class of collective tests of market efficiency used in class action securities litigation. The idea that Cammer/Krogman factors may be indicators and/or drivers of stock price reactivity is supported in this study. However not all factors are equal. Although the size factor is supported by individual (univariate) tests, it is not supported in the multivariate logit regressions when we use the median or the "best individual" threshold values, i.e. once we control for the other factors, size seems not to be important in these regressions. However, we found that when we use the quintile 2 minimum values, all factors but market makers are important. So the effect of size on reactivity may be exhausted in the lower tail of the factor distribution. Focusing on median values and the "best individual" thresholds logit regressions, factors other than size are supported by the multivariate logit regression and by univariate tests. The number of market makers suggested by the logit regressions should be at least 37.5 and the median number of 41 market makers maximizes the probability of reactivity. Although we cannot test the case of one analyst versus no analysts because all our stocks have at least one, we do find that 2.5 analysts (the minimum value of quintile 2) increases the probability of a stock being reactive and the "best individual" value for analysts in the multivariate logit regression is 5 analysts in our sample of stocks during 2012-2015.
To the extent reactivity rates are accepted as indicators of market efficiency, the results in this paper support the reliability and use of the Cammer/Krogman factors (volume, bid-ask spread, analyst coverage (number of analysts) and number of market makers) as relevant indicators of market, with the caveats discussed above. 
